China as a counter model
China's political system as a counter-model to market-based democracy

The success of the political system of the People's Republic of China is generated by various factors:
- Economic reforms and increased living standards,
- political will and pressure,
- massive investment at home and abroad, and
- the adaptability of the party and state leadership.
China's economic reform policy transformed one of the poorest and most populous countries on earth into a forward-looking economic superpower in just a few decades. The Chinese government is investing billions. The gigantic infrastructure investments, the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI), secure the supply of raw materials, the global expansion of infrastructure and expand China's political influence. Behind the large-scale programs, which are also intended to establish China's technology leadership position in the future, is strategic political will, reinforced by pressure and supplemented by patriotic and ideological guidelines.
The anti-corruption program is one of the biggest mass campaigns since Mao's time. The Chinese government leaves no doubt that it is cracking down on the party, the judiciary and the security organs and, as the example of big businessman Jack Ma and the Alibaba Group shows, does not allow critical voices from private industry. After all, the Chinese Communist Party has learned to adapt and modernize.
Few political systems are as forward-looking and technology-oriented, assertive and at the same time prepared to defend positions of power and assert interests.

For the common good of all under heaven. Tiānxià wèi gōng. - Calligraphy by Sun Yat-sen. Image: Wikipedia
For the common good of all under heaven. Tiānxià wèi gōng. - Calligraphy by Sun Yat-sen. Image: Wikipedia

Tianxia thought - center: son of heaven (= emperor of China, officials, civilians) - inner subjects - outer subjects - tribute states ... (with subsequent `barbarians' collective term in the north: Beidi, East: Dongyi, South: Nanman, West: Xiro ...uninfluenced area). Image: CC BY-SA 3.0
Tianxia thought - center: son of heaven (= emperor of China, officials, civilians) - inner subjects - outer subjects - tribute states ... (with subsequent `barbarians' collective term in the north: Beidi, East: Dongyi, South: Nanman, West: Xiro ...uninfluenced area). Image: CC BY-SA 3.0
China sees itself as a millennia-old advanced civilization whose cultural sphere and sphere of influence extend beyond its borders and have shaped the Asian region. However, the concept of "tianxia" (literally "everything under heaven") refers less to a global claim to power than to a hierarchical structure of order. The understanding of having been one of the world's leading powers until the early 19th century, which today naturally claims a place at the top again, is widespread.
The successful economic policy, the significantly improved living conditions and the prospect of the Chinese Dream, a Strong Nation with a Strong Military, promised by President Xi Jinping, contribute to the acceptance and legitimacy of the political system. Most Chinese are reasonably satisfied with their state and party leadership. Criticism, of course, is above the local level, not to be expressed.
The multi-stage economic development of the People's Republic of China appears to be a growth miracle of a new quality.
The political will to lead and develop is catapulting China to the position of a global leader in the 21st century with unprecedented economic policy campaigns. "Made in China 2025" (industrial strategy for technology leadership), "China 2035" (master plan for innovation leadership and comprehensive moderate prosperity), "China 2049" (achievement of all goals for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China), "Belt and Road Initiative" - BRI (global infrastructure investment program), for example, are the programs with which China also wants to become a high-tech leading power.
Fascinating in this context is the rich interpretive art of the political leadership in Beijing.
Finally, the constitutional principles of a socialist state and the democratic dictatorship of the people under the leadership of the Communist Party also apply in the new, rich and thoroughly digitalized China. It can be assumed that this will succeed through a constant reinterpretation and reinterpretation of the primacy of revolution and the commitment to the constant development of socialist values. Everything is development, reform and must serve the construction of a socialist society.
The formative power of President, Party leader and Chairman of the Military Commission Xi Jinping, shows in particular with his ambitious vision of the Chinese Dream, which is nevertheless very different from the moderate policy divises of the past. There is nothing higher than the fulfillment of the new and old dream of national greatness. Xi Jinping also initiated one of the greatest campaigns of the post-Maoist era, the long-term anti-corruption program. The greatness of the Chinese Dream and the many victims of the anti-corruption campaign also call into question the stability and sustainability of the Beijing system. If the current party and state leader, Xi Jinping, does not succeed in stabilizing or resolving the numerous challenges ranging from uprisings to economic slowdowns and epidemics, he faces the threat of being replaced, despite the abundance of power and the lifting of term limits. The party system is concerned with maintaining power.

China's new Silk Road network, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is a gigantic infrastructure investment program that can also be interpreted as a foreign policy blueprint for China's global power and foreign policy aspirations. BRI will also go down in the books as an initiative of Xi Jinping and part of the Chinese Dream. Belt and Road (BRI) is creating strategic economic corridors, new trade centers, and communication channels around the world while securing energy production and China's raw material supply. The belt, "Belt," represents the land links, "Road" stands for the sea routes.
The Silk Road Initiative combines four programmatic pillars that support and represent China's new global economic and foreign policy:
- First, the land-based economic and communications corridors linking East Asia to Europe (and beyond to the world).
- The second is the "Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century," which will expand maritime routes, establish new strategic links and bases, and underpin China's maritime claim to control and presence - at least in the East Asian region. Access points to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are to be secured via Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
- Third, the "Polar Silk Roads," documenting China's interest in resources at both poles.
- Fourth, China's Space Initiative, which, while admonishing the prevailing civilian use of space, does not want to be banned from military capabilities.

Financial policy interests also play a role. The Chinese government wants to place its currency better internationally and offer it as an alternative on the capital market and in payment transactions ("petro yuan"). This works best through its own newly developed industries and trade routes. However, the Silk Road initiatives are not only about raw materials, energy supply, transport and logistics, but also about the gold of the future: data and communication.
Control over networks and data streams automatically results in a position of power and enables sovereignty over new technical standards.
The People's Republic is a competitive supplier of high-performance technology. China is also investing purposefully in future markets and structures. The populous countries of Africa and South Asia have great growth potential.
Criticism of China's Belt and Road Initiative relates to questions of economic viability, financing and sensible transport links. Oversized power plants were planned, and roads and bridges were built without connections. The financing of large infrastructure projects overburdens weaker economies, they run into a debt trap. Structurally and financially weak states such as Laos, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Montenegro are finding it difficult to resist Chinese construction and financing offers. Other points of criticism include questions about tendering modalities, compliance with environmental and social conditions, and possible corruption, especially in large transport projects. Contractors and lenders are mostly Chinese companies and banks. However, they also suffer from planning deficiencies and financing gaps.
The high-growth phase is over, China's economy is being restructured. The low-wage sector is migrating to cheaper foreign countries. China's municipalities are in debt. The willingness to invest double-digit billions abroad is declining when social concerns, such as the expansion of the health care system, become more urgent.
The West represents only 12% of the world's population and will not be able to maintain its claim to international order. Xi Jinping presented himself at the World Economic Forum 2017 as a defender of globalization and free trade, as well as a balance against uncertainties emanating from Washington.
In the relationship with China, we observe shifts in power. The People's Republic is investing political and economic capital strategically in order to occupy free space and create an environment that is committed to its own interests, both in its neighborhood and internationally.
Developments in Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Corona crisis and global economic development will show how much resilience and future viability China's political system and its socialist market economy possess.
Saskia Hieber is a lecturer in International Politics at the Academy for Political Education in Tutzing and a lecturer in International Politics Asia at the University of Regensburg.